About This Blog

Judging Crimes is a blog about criminal law, violent crime and the judiciary, dedicated to making the liberal case for greater democratic control of the criminal justice system.  It's a "view from the trenches" because it's written by a practitioner, not an academic or journalist.  It examines the changing role of the judiciary in American society by looking at what judges actually do, rather than what they say.  I know what they do because I deal with the consequences every day. 

Opinions issued by judges, from Supreme Court justices on down, are justifications for the exercise of governmental power.  But it is the exercise of power itself that should command our attention, not the justifications.  Judging Crimes is concerned with the reality of judicial power rather than the verbal formulas used to defend it. 

American law professors have long liked to say they teach their students "to think like a lawyer."  Learning to think that way is a matter of internalizing certain assumptions.  The practice of judging is likewise based on a foundation of shared assumptions, among them that the United States Constitution -- a document of 8,335 words, the length of a book chapter -- provides an answer to every question.  Rather like a Ouija board.

These assumptions are so ingrained -- and their internalization is so necessary to the successful practice of law -- that most people who subscribe to them aren't even aware of having done so.  Judging Crimes will try to engage not just with the expressions of judicial power, but with the assumptions on which those expressions  rest.  

Judging Crimes won't be filled with daily entries commenting on the day's events or provide a best-of-the-web welter of links.  Many other blogs already do that, far better than I could hope to do.  (Check out these.)  Instead, Judging Crimes will contain pieces of a length that might seem long for a blog but would be short in a serious magazine.  I hope to post new pieces several times a week.

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Sunday
20Nov

5. The Constitution's Rosetta Stone

In The Federalist 48-51, Madison brilliantly filled in the gaps in Montesquieu's doctrine of the distribution of powers.  Those numbers of The Federalist are a Rosetta Stone for anyone wishing to interpret the political significance of any judge's ruling in any case, civil or criminal.  

The United States Constitution has only one subject: power.  It distributes power between the states and the central government, and then divides the central government's share of power between its three branches, and then it limits the government's use of power against its citizens. 

Necessarily, then, every constitutional ruling by a court is a ruling on the distribution of powers.  It's an application of -- or an adjustment to -- Madison's ideas. 

The Declaration of Independence held it to be a self-evident truth that the only legitimate basis for government is the consent of the governed.  The underlying democratic theory of the Constitution is -- can only be -- that the people of the United States agreed to put certain subjects beyond the reach of alteration by democracy.   That is, they democratically chose to limit their democracy.

This means that the very concept of a new constitutional doctrine is a paradox.  If it's new,  then by definition the governed did not consent to it when they accepted the Constitution and its amendments as a limitation on their power to govern themselves.     

America's criminal justice system once said: "If we catch you doing something terrible to another human being, we will  punish you."  Now it says: "If we catch you doing something terrible to another human being, we may -- or may not -- punish you."  The contingency was introduced by judges who discovered that the Constitution gave them previously-unrecognized power to conceal information from juries (to "suppress evidence"), and to refuse to enforce democractically-enacted laws (to "find them unconstitutional").   

The switch from an unconditional to a conditional criminal law was announced by judges as a series of new constitutional doctrines, a process that began in earnest in the 1950s and continues to this day.  Because our criminal justice system was transformed by constitutional rulings, it cannot be changed back by democratic means.   American citizens no longer have the political power to decide for themselves how to use the powers of government to protect themselves from physical harm. 

The "constitutionalization" of criminal procedure was not simply a revolution in the practice of criminal law, but a fundamental reordering of society.  It was -- and is -- a process of de-democratization. 

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