Saturday, April 29, 2006 at 11:00PM in
Judging the judges,
Judicial self-interest Judging Crimes is a blog about criminal law, violent crime and the judiciary, dedicated to making the liberal case for greater democratic control of the criminal justice system. It's a "view from the trenches" because it's written by a practitioner, not an academic or journalist. It examines the changing role of the judiciary in American society by looking at what judges actually do, rather than what they say. I know what they do because I deal with the consequences every day.
Opinions issued by judges, from Supreme Court justices on down, are justifications for the exercise of governmental power. But it is the exercise of power itself that should command our attention, not the justifications. Judging Crimes is concerned with the reality of judicial power rather than the verbal formulas used to defend it.
American law professors have long liked to say they teach their students "to think like a lawyer." Learning to think that way is a matter of internalizing certain assumptions. The practice of judging is likewise based on a foundation of shared assumptions, among them that the United States Constitution -- a document of 8,335 words, the length of a book chapter -- provides an answer to every question. Rather like a Ouija board.
These assumptions are so ingrained -- and their internalization is so necessary to the successful practice of law -- that most people who subscribe to them aren't even aware of having done so. Judging Crimes will try to engage not just with the expressions of judicial power, but with the assumptions on which those expressions rest.
Judging Crimes won't be filled with daily entries commenting on the day's events or provide a best-of-the-web welter of links. Many other blogs already do that, far better than I could hope to do. (Check out these.) Instead, Judging Crimes will contain pieces of a length that might seem long for a blog but would be short in a serious magazine. I hope to post new pieces several times a week.
Prehistory was a great time to be a judge. You could sit in the back of the cave, holding that symbol of your office, the reindeer thighbone, and adjudicate your little heart out. Two men arguing about who deserved the honors of the mastodon kill, or who got first dibs on the 12-year-old girl snatched during the raid on the neighboring clan - you just pointed with the bone, pronounced your judgment, made the appropriate factual findings and conclusions of law ("Ugada!") and the matter was settled. No legislative enactments to cramp your style, no tiresome arguments by attorneys, no appellate court to say "ugada" right back at you. Justice was purely personal, a question of how you felt about the parties, and that made the Ice Age judge heaven.
Just as eels find their way from fresh waters to the Sargasso Sea, and as Homo Freudian lives the life demanded by his unconscious drives, so judges of our day find themselves mysteriously drawn back to the ugada principle. A wish to experience that edenic freedom to adjudicate as one pleases, free of constraint - what else could explain the multi-factor balancing tests so au courant in the Supreme Court of the 70s and 80s? Balancing tests allow a judge to point the reindeer bone at one party or the other, announce that a careful weighing of the factors leads ineluctably to a ruling in that party's favor, and presto! Or, rather, ugada. And who can argue with it?
The multi-part balancing test most familiar to criminal lawyers, of course, is "'the balancing of competing interests' [that is] 'the key principle of the Fourth Amendment.'" All a judge needs to do is first decide who wins, then announce the appropriate verbal formula (or ask the winning party to draft an order that recites it), and totality of the circumstances / reasonable suspicion / ripened into probable cause, or inchoate hunch / lack of particularized suspicion / fourth amendment violation. Or, in other words, ugada.
For a particularly exuberant example of the ugada principle in action, we have Monterey's Judge Jose A. Velasquez. (A tip of the hat to me-mo, who linked to a Monterey Herald story about Judge Velasquez in a comment to post 104.) According to the press release from the California Commission on Judicial Performance, Judge Velasquez
(1) found defendants who were not alleged to have violated probation in violation and sentenced them to jail, without due process; (2) increased sentences in response to defendants' questions or comments; (3) improperly based sentences on defendants' answers to his questions how how it felt to commit the crime; (4) did not give defendants being arraigned in certain cases the option of pleading not guilty; (5) issued bench warrants for defendants whose attorneys arrived late to court ...
Unlike most disciplinary complaints against judges, the Commission's formal charges against Judge Velasquez are a bit tedious to read, because he is alleged to have done the same things over and over again. His abuses of power seem to have gone on for years. (Look at count three, beginning on page 30 - it was evidently a regular thing with him.)
Like Florida's Judge Sloop (see post 87) and the presumptuous federal magistrate judge who started conducting himself like a god (see post 98), he is alleged to have meted out arbitrary punishment to anyone less punctual than himself. Like New York's legendary Judge Duckman (see post 83), he is alleged to have ignored the law while making up facts as necessary to justify his rulings.
The behavior of all these judges is easier to understand if you rid your mind of all those stock campaign photos of dignified black-robed figures posed in front of shelves filled with of identically-bound books. Picture them instead in the back of a sooty cave, a carnivore's fur draped over their shoulders, clutching that reindeer bone and pronouncing over a disputed haunch of giant sloth. Ah, those were the days.
Saturday, April 29, 2006 at 11:00PM in
Judging the judges,
Judicial self-interest
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