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247. Parchment barriers

What can you do if a state government enacts legislation that clearly - no apologies and no doubt - violates the first amendment?  Why, you wait until a court declares the legislation unconstitutional. 

But what happens if the unconstitutional legislation is enacted by a court?

That's not supposed to happen, given our separation of powers.  But, then, "[i]t will not be denied, that power is of an encroaching nature".  After distinguishing in theory between legislative, executive and judicial power, James Madison wrote in The Federalist that

the next and most difficult task is to provide some practical security for each, against the invasion of the others.

What this security ought to be, is the great problem to be solved. Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments, in the constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power? This is the security which appears to have been principally relied on by the compilers of most of the American constitutions. But experience assures us, that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly overrated[.]

The uselessness of parchment barriers is demonstrated by the practice, now universal among state supreme courts, of promulgating rules.  Modern lawyers' lives are so bound around by court-promulgated rules that most don't even know that court-made rules are a recent phenomenon, like zits on a preteen's nose.  Here's a useful short description of the sort of legislation courts enact these days, tracing the history of the practice all the way back to ...  1934.  Blackstone, it ain't.  The modern rules regime is as traditional as a tract home

Legislation is easily distinguished from adjudication.  One is forward-looking and of universal application.  The other is backward-looking, applying only to the parties actually before the court.  

A rule issued by a state supreme court is forward-looking, of universal application.  (One might quibble and say it's actually administrative rulemaking rather than legislation, but that just complicates the separation of powers analysis without producing a different result.)

A court that enacts legislation is acting in a legislative capacity.  That, I think, is self-evident.  It's when courts enact plainly unconstitutional legislation that things gets interesting.  Take, for example, Oregon's  Uniform Trial Court Rule 3.120.  It says that "parties, witnesses or court employees must not initiate contact with any juror concerning any case which that juror was sworn to try."  (Lawyers are defined as "parties" for purposes of this rule.  UTCR 1.110(1).)

We've learned recently that judges have a first amendment right to hit up lawyers for campaign contributions, even when those lawyers have cases pending in front of the judge.  (The Arkansas Supreme Court recently observed: "While a regulation limiting solicitation or acceptance of campaign contributions may seem to limit a judicial candidate's conduct rather than his political speech, precedent of the United States Supreme Court instructs otherwise."  [See the Simes decision on this list.]  It's that po-faced word "instructs" that gives the irony its bite.)

If the judge's solicitation of money is protected by the first amendment, how is it even possible to think that the Oregon rule is constitutional?  It prevents a lawyer or a party - a party, just a plain ordinary mossbacked Oregonian - from asking an ex-juror to talk about the only thing they have in common.  The rule is what is known - and here we really are talking Blackstone - as a "previous restraint" on speech, or what's generally called today a prior restraint, and those are prohibited except for reasons as compelling as the prohibition on publicizing troop movements in wartime.  

I don't think it's possible even to argue that the Oregon rule is constitutional as written.  It's not on the border.  It's way out there in the middle of Siberia, about as far from any border as it's possible to get. 

So what's a nice state like Oregon doing with rule like that on its books?

The explanation is one Madison would have no trouble understanding.  According to the Oregon judiciary's website, the rule is enacted by a single person - called, with the proper note of tribal subservience, "Chief."  Yes, the Oregon chief justice is personally credited with enacting the whole panoply of rules governing the practice of law in Oregon's trial courts

What trial judge is going to say that the chief justice's own personal rule is illegal?  There's no check.    There's no balance.   So a patently unconstitutional law is maintained in place by the people whose job it is to see that the law complies with the Constitution.

(I don't know of any other state that describes its rules as the accomplishments of the chief justice personally.  You could hardly ask for a more straightforward declaration that government by the judiciary has nothing to do with democracy.)

There's currently a proposal in Oregon to amend the ridiculous rule and it seems to have picked up a fair amount of support.  Here in New Mexico it's customary for the judge to tell the jurors they can stick around if they want, but don't have to.  Usually a few accept the invitation, frequently because they have questions of their own.  What they have to say can be extremely useful.

And it's not just useful in the sense of letting a lawyer know that scratching the interior of his ear with the barrel of his pen distracts from his opening statement, or that heavy sarcasm plays better among his lawyer buddies over drinks than it does on cross-examination of a trembling witness answering in a little tiny voice.  Jurors notice everything, but they often process it in a way that wouldn't even occur to lawyers, who tend to run like slot cars in a single track.

One woman I knew was a juror in a case tried by a fairly well-known attorney.  The judge ruled that a certain item of evidence was inadmissible and the lawyer spent the next half-hour trying to backdoor it, attempting various clever stratagems to get around the judge's ruling.  The jurors thought, I know the judge won't let it in, how come he doesn't get it?  They thought: What an idiot!  (His client didn't win.)

Then there was the parental-kidnapping case in which the husband admitted striking the wife, producing a gusher of a bloody nose.  There was the eyewitness testimony of the neighbor and photographs of blood spattered all over the white door.  There was basically no defense to the charge of battery, so defense counsel devoted her closing to other, winnable points, and the prosecutor hardly said more.  But the jury acquitted on that count.

The acquittal seemed to make no sense, especially since the same jury convicted on other, more complex and contested charges.  But then the prosecutor talked to the jurors after the trial was over and heard: "He didn't intend to hurt her, he just intended to kidnap the kid."   The verdict was actually perfectly logical, if you started from the (mistaken) premise that  "intent" means "motive."

These types of insights can't come from any source but the jurors.  Once their service is over, they and the parties and the lawyers are released from the magic spell of courtroom decorum.  They become ordinary American citizens again.  And American citizens are allowed to converse.

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Reader Comments (1)

Well, this doesn't undermine your various points (all of which I agree with), but why couldn't a litigant seek a declaratory judgment against the rule in federal court? In a properly constructed state court system, such an approach would not be necessary, but it is a practical solution.
March 7, 2007 | Unregistered CommenterQuestion

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